How Do We Forgive Our Fathers (Poem) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words

How Do We Forgive Our Fathers (Poem) - Essay Example The speaker of the poem is most probably a son, a son who faces the double dilemmas of knowing himself and knowing his father, without losing touch with his own identity. The poem suggests that a father’s masculinity defines his personality, which in turn, shapes his attitudes and behaviors as a husband and a father to his family; in other words, masculinity develops and delimits his destiny, a destiny that is intertwined with his children’s identities. In the first stanza, the poem looks at his father through the haze of the past and the future. The first line states: â€Å"How do we forgive our Fathers?† (Lourie 1). These words ask all children about forgiving their fathers. â€Å"Fathers† is capitalized, which makes it more personal because a son would say â€Å"Father† not â€Å"father.† It is in plural form too, which connotes the universality of having fathers as a shared experience. The first line also evokes the image of a father who must be forgiven. The speaker no longer asks if people need to forgive their fathers, but focuses on the process, the â€Å"how.† Apparently, the speaker does not know the process of forgiving someone as important in his life as a father. The poet continues the thought to the second line, which states: â€Å"Maybe in a dream† (Lourie 2). ... The future may be bleak when children have a hard time forgiving their fathers. The question of forgiveness is perceived with both hesitation and opportunity. The next few lines of the first stanza introduce the greatest faults of fathers in general. The third line continues to the idea of fathers’ deficiencies. It states: â€Å"Do we forgive our Fathers for leaving us too often or forever† (Lourie 3). Instead of answering the question â€Å"how,† the poet refers to the reasons why people have to forgive their fathers. The shift of the content from the â€Å"how† to the â€Å"why† provides a clearer explanation of the context of forgiveness. What have fathers done to be forgiven? The poet answers that fathers sometimes leave their families too much or forever, wherein â€Å"too often† means they always have to go to work, and for their spare time, they drink or spend it with their colleagues and friends. This aspect of fatherhood highlights c lass, race, and gender issues. The working class, especially low-income minority groups, spends their lifetime working to make ends meet. As fathers, the patriarchal society expects them to be the breadwinners, which is a gender issue. As men of the house, they must make money, or else, society questions their masculinity. To leave â€Å"forever,† on the contrary, means that the father has abandoned his family. He has sired a child and left him/her to his/her mother. This kind of fatherhood is criticized, but not as blatantly as mothers who abandon their children. Somehow, a masculine world condones abandoning fathers as an acceptable norm. These reasons for forgiving fathers are important because they undermine the essence of a father. A father who is gone or almost always gone can hardly be a father in

Lap 5 Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Lap 5 - Assignment Example Jupiter has a diameter of 142,800km while the sun’s diameter is 1,391,400km. Therefore, the ratio of Jupiter’s diameter to diameter of the sun is 238:2319. Moreover, Jupiter (142,800km) is the largest planet while Mercury (4,878km) is the smallest planet thus the ratio of the largest planet to smallest planet in terms of diameter is 23800:813. The planets seem to fall into groups based on size; smaller planets seem to be in a particular group while bigger planets seem to be in a different group such as Mercury, Mars, Venus and Earth are in one group while Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune seem to be in another group. The surface composition of smaller planets in one group is rocky. Conversely, the surface composition of larger planets is gaseous and frozen gas. The two main differences are the surface composition and the size. The bigger planets also consist of rings, bringing out another clear-cut difference. Terrestrial group consists of Mercury, Mars, Venus and Earth while the members of Jovian group are Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. The difference between the prediction of Bode’s rule and the actual distances is negligible with a range of 0.01-0.02. The planets include Saturn and Neptune. One of the regularities in the planetary orbits discovered by Kepler is moving of planets around the sun in the same direction and the planets having nearly similar orbital planes (Topper

The spy genre

The spy genre The spy genre is intellectually satisfying for its thrilling blend of espionage, international setting, assassinations, secret agencies, ruthless villains, and fast moving action. The Bourne Trilogy does not disappoint viewers with a predictable plot; rather it reinvents the genre with an appealing protagonist, Jason Bourne who is regarded with sympathy throughout the narrative of the films, despite the suspicions cast over him at times. The pursuit and pursued formula that characterises spy genres is cleverly sustained in the Bourne films. The Bourne Ultimatum has an interesting twist in terms of the expected spy plot, as Bourne is the pursuer. The films psychologically portray the themes of betrayal, corruption, power, and greed in a way that is glamorised, while at the same time highlighting tremendous injustice. The Bourne Ultimatum is renowned for its cleverly arranged film structure in that the story is set in several different time frames. These time frames are the story of Bourne being chased, but also Bournes numerous flashbacks that take place throughout the film; at 415 East 71st Street, where Bourne meets Albert Hirsch, who ran Treadstones psychological conditioning programme many of these occur. Hirsch was the one who broken down Bourne in order to make him trainable as a Treadstone agent. In this scene, there is a particularly spectacular flashback in which Jason is shown, deprived of sleep sitting at a table. Dr Hirsch tells Bourne: â€Å"Really give yourself to this programme. [Treadstone]†. Bourne is then shown holding a gun and quickly fires two bullets at a tied up hostage. Hirsch then tells Bourne that he is no longer David Webb (his real name). This is a turning point in the plot as it shows when Jason Bourne lost his real identity. The films structure is also clever in that the majority of the films events precede those of the Bourne Supremacy, filling in the interim from when he left Moscow and went to New York City. An example is in London where Bourne meets Simon Ross, a journalist and finds out about Blackbriar. He then tries to protect Simons life, as the CIA have picked up on Simons knowledge about Blackbriar from a phone call that he made through ECHELON, a call monitoring service. However, Bourne fails to protect him, as Simon does not follow Bournes instructions. Another example is when he is Tangier with Nicky searching for Neal Daniels, who was involved in Treadstone. However, Daniels is killed by Desh, a Blackbriar operative before they can interrogate him. Other places that feature in the storyline are Moscow, Paris, London, Madrid, Tangier, and New York City. The story from these places takes up about two thirds of the film, after which point the conclusion / resolution to the Bourne trilogy is sh own. Another unique point of the Bourne trilogy, but particularly The Bourne Ultimatum, is that the spy genre is more intellectual, and requires more thinking to unravel the story. When Bourne tells Landy to meet him at Tudor City alone, Landy goes, followed by Vosen and his team. Bourne phones Vosen: â€Å"Where are you now?† and Vosen replies â€Å"Im sitting in my office.† Bourne then says that he doubts that as if he were in his office, they would be talking face to face. Bourne then hangs up and opens Vosens safe ingeniously, using a recording of Vosens voice. This scene is fast-paced and set in low light, common in spy-genre films. As Bourne hangs up, fast-paced music, non-diegetic sound starts and the viewer immediately knows that a chase scene will follow. By the third instalment, scenes like this such one are the audiences expectations, as the spy-genre becomes increasingly more intellectual and involves increasingly more advanced technology with each instalment in the trilogy. The Bourne Ultimatum has been described as â€Å"an oasis in a sea of contrived, overreaching action films† which shows that it is appreciated for its impressive new take on the spy genre. The structure of each film in the series, in detail follows a common pattern with an opening scene of intrigue, followed by a mission that Bourne undertakes to answer questions and concludes with some form of resolve. In the Bourne Identity, Bourne is found lying in the ocean and is rescued by some Italian fishermen, and cannot remember who he is. He discovers that he can speak several different languages and has a wide range of skills that he can use, as when he ties a knot in a rope on the Italian mens fishing boat, without thinking. It is later revealed that he has these skills due to his partaking in a programme called â€Å"Operation Treadstone†. In Operation Treadstone, the agents would be broken down and then trained to do what was required of them, as in Bournes case usually assassinations. Later in the film, he regains pieces of his memory through stimuli, like when Conklin says: â€Å"For Christs sake, youre the one who picked the yacht as a goddamn strike point!† He then has a flashback and remembers the attempted assassination where he was supposed to kill Nykwana Wombosi, an African dictator. At the end of the Bourne Identity, he goes to a scooter rental shop in Greece where Marie is working. The camera zooms in to a medium close up shot in order to show Marie Jasons reactions other after last seeing each other at Eamons house in the French countryside. Non-diegetic sound, namely the theme music (Extreme Ways by Moby) starts to play signifying the end of the film and that they are reunited. This non-diegetic sound In the Bourne Supremacy, Bourne and Marie are together in India and Bourne does not wish to work for the CIA and wants to be independent, as cited in the Bourne Identity, when Bourne tells Conklin: â€Å"Youre gonna go tell them [the CIA] that Jason Bourne is dead†. This is said in a commanding way and highlights Jasons desire to be free from his pursuers. Marie is later killed by a Russian assassin, who was targeting Bourne. Bourne travels to Italy to find out why he is again being pursued. Bourne is pursued by the CIA for the murders of two men, of which he is framed by Ward Abbott who has his fingerprint planted. Bourne later interrogates Nicky Parsons, a CIA agent who was involved in the logistics arm of Treadstone, and discovers that Conklin was not the head of Treadstone, rather it was Abbott. Bourne goes after Abbott and records a conversation with him, and holds a gun to his head, Abbott in response saying: â€Å"Go ahead, go on. Go on! Do it! Do it!† at which p oint Bourne replies â€Å"She [Marie] wouldnt want me to†. This shows Jasons love for Marie, even after her death. After this Bourne goes to Moscow, where he is pursued in a car chase by Kirill, a Russian Blackbriar operative. Bourne eventually kills Kirill by forcing his car to crash into a concrete divider in a tunnel. He then goes to see Irena, the daughter of Vladimir Neski, the Russian politician that he killed. He tells her that he was responsible for their deaths and on leaving, says â€Å"Im sorry.† The viewer is sympathetical toward Bourne in this scene, because they know that Bourne was trained as a Treadstone operative and thought at the time that he was doing the right thing. At the end of the film, Pamela Landy is speaking on the phone to Bourne and says: â€Å"Why dont you come in and well talk about it.† Bourne replies â€Å"Get some rest, Pam. You look tired.† At this point Landy looks out of the window trying to pinpoint where Bourne is. Bourne is then shown walking through New York City. The way this sequence is filmed is interesting, as in the Bourne Supremacy, Landy is shown speaking, however Bourne is also shown speaking, allowing the viewer to see his reactions to the phone call. In the Bourne Ultimatum, this is shown once again, but with different camera angles. Bourne and Landy are shown speaking on the phone, but there is a flashback during the phone call, which is evoked by Landy telling Bourne his real name, David Webb and his date of birth. During the conversation, Noah Vosen and a group of CIA agents are listening in on the conversation and attempting to trace the phone call. As Bourne tells Landy that she â€Å"looks tired † the agents and Vosen realises that Jason is very close. In the Bourne Ultimatum, before the events that lead up to the phone call mentioned, Bourne is a fugitive in Moscow. He manages to evade the Moscow police long enough to treat his wounds in a pharmacy. He is confronted by an officer, whom he renders unconscious. He holds another officer at gunpoint. The officer asks Bourne not to kill him, and Bourne replies in Russian, â€Å"My argument is not with you.† This is typical of spy-genre films, as most spies featured in the genre will only kill people who they have to, or who are directed to kill. There is a role-reversal in this Bourne movie, as Bourne is the pursuer. Bourne is then shown in Paris, where he meets with Maries stepbrother to inform him of her death. Bourne searches for the individuals who trained him in Operation Treadstone throughout the film, through many sources; namely Nicky Parsons, Treadstones former logistics and mental health manager and who is suggested to have had a romantic relationship with Bourne befor e the Wombosi incident. He discovers that Neal Daniels was one of his trainers. Daniels is killed in Tangier by Desh, a Blackbriar operative who then goes after Nicky under CIA instructions. Bourne kills him and sends Nicky away on a bus for her safety. Bourne then searches through a burnt briefcase that belonged to Neal Daniels and discovers the charred remains of a CIA document, with the CIA New York substations address on it. Bourne then enters another building and spies on Pamela Landy and Noah Vosen in the CIA building. Bourne notices that Vosen has some documents on Blackbriar in a safe in his office. He then calls Pamela Landy: â€Å"I hear youre still looking for me. What do you want?† Landy: â€Å"I wanted to thank you for the tape. Its all tied off. Its over.† Landy then tells Bourne that his real name is David Webb and his birthday is 4/15/71 (US date format). This is the same scene as at the end of the Bourne Supremacy. After telling Pamela, that â€Å"she looks tired†, a chase ensues after Bourne sends Landy a text message telling her to meet him at Tudor City. It is later found out that Bournes birthday is actually 13/9/70. The CIA immediately picks up on this and discovers that it is a code to the former Treadstone training facility. Here he meets Albert Hirsch, one of the men who trained him as a Treadstone agent. Bourne points a gun at his head, but does not kill him as he says that Hirsch doesnt deserve â€Å"the star that they give you at Langley†, a reference to stars on the wall in the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia that are a memorial to agents killed in action. At the end of the film, Bourne is shown on the run from the CIA. A Blackbriar operative then points a gun at him, but after hearing Bournes speech: â€Å"Do you even know why youre supposed to kill me? Look at us. Look at what they make you give†, the agent spares Bournes life and Bourne is shown running toward the edge of the rooftop. However as he jumps off headed into a river, Noah Vosen shoots at him. He falls into the water, the viewer neither knowing if he survived or was killed and his body is shown not moving in the water with eerie downbeat music starting to play. The focus then switches to Pamela Landy giving a speech to US senators. She tells them of the Blackbriar programme, saying: â€Å"The file indicates that Ezra Kramer [Director of the CIA] authorised six illegal†¦Ã¢â‚¬  the focus then switching to a reporters voice on a television, with Nicky watching. The reporter says that there is â€Å"a growing scandal† over â€Å"an alleged government ass assination programme code-named Blackbriar†. It goes on to say that, Ezra Kramer is under criminal investigation, Landy obviously having managed to have him prosecuted. The reporter then says that Hirsch and Vosen have been arrested and â€Å"Meanwhile, mystery surrounds the fate of David Webb, also known as Jason Bourne, the source behind the exposure of the Blackbriar programme†. It says that Bourne was reported to have been shot and fallen from â€Å"a Manhattan rooftop into the East River ten storeys below.† Finally, the reporter announces that even after a three-day search, â€Å"[Bournes] body has yet to be found.† Nicky smiles at this, realising that Jason must still be alive. The theme music (Extreme Ways by Moby) then starts to play, and Bourne is then shown swimming away down the river. This leaves a hint that possibly the series is not over, and that there is room for a sequel. In many films of the spy-genre, there is a hint that the series will carry on, and the Bourne Ultimatum is no exception. The language used in the three films is cryptic and there are many codenames used. Operation Blackbriar is a more advanced version of Operation Treadstone that allows the CIA in the Bourne Ultimatum to use lethal action if required, without consent. It is referred to frequently throughout the film, including when Simon Ross, the journalist who has been informed of Blackbriar, is hunted down; his source later turns out to Neal Daniels. The way that the characters speak also plays a major part in the film. Their way of speaking in emotionally detached, but not business-like, as they do not always explain all clearly to the audience. Usually this is rectified later in the films. The main people who speak in this way are the CIA, namely Pamela Landy, Abbott, Conklin, Kramer and Noah Vosen, amongst others. They speak in this way so as to create a theme of mystery and intrigue, which leaves the viewer curious, wanting to see more of the film. One scene of intrigue is when Bourne is with Simon Ross in Waterloo Station Concourse. Bourne has read one of his news stories about Jason Bourne and goes to meet him. Meanwhile, the CIA has picked up on a keyword that Ross said on a phone call through ECHELON. He becomes hunted by a number of the CIAs Blackbriar operatives. Bourne meets Ross near a newsagents in Waterloo Station. The lighting is low, and there is a lot of diegetic sound; passengers talking and announcements in the train station. Bourne asks Ross: â€Å"Whos your source? Whats his name? Whats your sources name?† Ross asks Bourne: â€Å"Look, whats going on? Why are these people after me? Bourne replies that the reason is because Ross found something and spoke to someone involved with Treadstone. Bourne asks again, who the source is and Ross replies â€Å"You know I cant tell you that.† Bourne tells him that he underestimates the CIA, and that they will kill him if needs be. Ross asks him if they are af ter him because of Blackbriar. Bourne discovers that it is a â€Å"Treadstone upgrade† as described by Ross. Bourne then sees one of the Blackbriar operatives; the first time that he realises what operation they are working for and tells Ross that they have to move. Fast-paced action music starts to play, indicative of the start of an important action sequence. The mise-en-scene at this point is a terminal swarming with passengers. This makes the scene slightly harder for the viewer to follow, and makes them pay more attention. Bourne tells Ross to answer his phone and Bourne continues giving him instructions via his phone. As Bourne is walking at a distance behind Ross, he notices numerous CIA operatives and tells Ross to tie his shoelace. The agents walk past and Ross unnoticed is told by Jason to walk along the far wall. Ross does this but sees a man with a waste trolley and believes him to be one of the operatives. He thinks that the man is reaching for a gun and runs thr ough the crowd away from him. Meanwhile, in New York, Vosen and his team are watching the CCTV cameras in the station and see Ross running through the crowds. The operatives are given the location of Ross and once again try to catch him. The lighting during this scene is bright/daylight, which means that the operatives, Bourne and Ross must be careful of their actions. One of the operatives them follows Ross and Bourne tells Ross to move into a shop, while Bourne knocks the asset unconscious. Bourne then tells Ross to go into the back of the store and locks the door. Ross does, but as he does this, two operatives see him and try to open the door unsuccessfully. They are seen walking out of the store by Bourne and he follows them, as they try to find another way into the back of the store. One aims to shoot Ross, but as he does so is rendered unconscious by Bourne. The music is fast paced at this point and in the back of the store, the light is artificial and bright. Numerous other o peratives then enter the room and Bourne manages to knock them all out. Diegetic sound is in the form of grunts from the men as Bourne does so. The mise-en-scene is bare, albeit with bodies strewn over the floor. Bourne realises that there is a camera in the room and that he and Ross have now been seen. Vosen in New York sees these images and believes Jason to be Ross source; that Ross is in league with him. There is a tense atmosphere in the CIA room, with computers and high-tech gear everywhere. Vosen is watching the station through CCTV on three large screens. He orders for all the exits of the station to be blocked and for Bourne and Ross to both be assassinated. While this happens, a Blackbriar operative has climbed a stairwell and is now stationed behind a revolving billboard. Bourne and Ross are now in a small room and are watching through a small window in the door for any operatives. Jason confronts Ross and tells him that he is going to get them out of there, but that Ross has to do exactly what he says. He confronts Ross, who is panicking and tells him â€Å"this isnt some story in a newspaper. (A reference to him being a journalist) This is real. You understand me?† Ross replies â€Å"OK† and Bourne exits the room, on the lookout for any operatives. The Blackbriar operative is seen behind the billboard, in a dark dingy environment, readying a sniper rifle. Vosen is then shown in the CIA substation again and tells his team: â€Å"Call all agents back. Give Bournes location at the back of the store to the asset. The asset then receives a message showing Bourne and Ross identities. Vosen orders the cameras to be â€Å"killed†, specifically not pointed at the concourse where the sniper would presumably be firing. Bourne is still communicating with Ross by phone. Bourne tells him that he feels that â€Å"something isnt right† (an excellent perception by Bourne, which shows that he has been trained as an expert). Ross says to Bourne via phone: â€Å"I can see the entrance from here. If I go now I can make it. Bourne tells Ross to remain. Ross then tells Bourne that he does not think they should wait and, panicking again says he thinks, â€Å"Someones coming†. Bourne meanwhile has seen something move when the billboard revolves. Ross then says, â€Å"Im going for it.† Bourne, desperate shouts at Ross â€Å"No, no, no, no, no!† but Ross does not listen and tries to run quickly out of the room. The sniper then quickly shoots Ross in the head from behind the billboard. There is diegetic sound commotion is this part, people screaming and police officers whistles. Bourne manages to take Simons notes from his pockets and slip away unnoticed. Meanwhile, the sniper searches for Bourne in the crowd, but sees him coming closer, and realising that Bourne knows where he is, quickly starts to escape. A chase between Bourne and the sniper, with Bourne as the pursuer quickly ensues. Bourne spots t he sniper and runs after him, chasing him down a dingy stairwell and a London Underground station. The camera movement in this scene is shaky and handheld, and adds to the excitement factor that the music already brings. The sniper manages to slip onto a train and the doors shut just as Bourne reaches it. Bourne then comes face to face with his enemy as the train leaves, a moment of extreme tension. The focus then cuts to Vosen. Another interesting scene is the scene in which Bourne and Nicky enter Tangier via ferry. As they enter the ferry terminal there is a lot of diegetic from passengers and low, action music with a quickening beat. The focus then switches to Desh, a Blackbriar operative. He leaves Tangier airport, where diegetic sound can be heard, aeroplanes taking off and landing and airport announcements. He is shown entering a taxi. The focus switches to Vosen quickly, a man saying, â€Å"Asset has arrived at the airport†. The use of the word asset shows the CIAs ruthlessness; if an asset is killed, another one can be used. Bourne and Nicky are shown walking down a busy street, full of civilians. They are shown entering a hotel room and Nicky sets up a laptop. In the meantime, Neal Daniels is shown hurriedly leaving a taxi. Vosen is shown in the dark CIA substation in New York and says: â€Å"Give the asset subject [Daniels] location and the route between the subjects hotel and the bank.â₠¬  Desh is shown in a taxi receiving this information. Nicky logs in securely to the CIA on her laptop. Desh is then shown entering a dark gloomy garage, where a motorbike is parked. All the time these events happen, anticipative music is playing in the background. Nicky then searches on the CIAs service for Daniels location, but is blocked by the firewall. She tells Bourne â€Å"Theyll get one of the operatives to terminate him.† Again, this highlights the CIAs ruthless nature. Bourne tells her to â€Å"find out who.† They discover that it is Desh. They plan to follow him in order to find the location of Daniels. Desh is shown preparing for the assassination when Nicky sends him a message, telling him to meet her at a local cafà ©. He then closes the phone, and a remote-detonating bomb is shown. He then sets off through Tangier by motorbike. An aerial image of Tangier is shown, as in many spy films there is an international setting and this interests the viewers fur ther to see the skyline of the city, which sets the scene. Vosen and his team are shown in New York again, and a woman tells Vosen: â€Å"Sir, the asset is deviating off course.† Vosen responds by saying not to take any action. The deviation is of course due to Nicky telling Desh to meet her at a cafà ©, specifically â€Å"Cafà © de Paris†. A congested street is then shown with diegetic sound and non-diegetic sound, the diegetic being the honks of car horns and the non-diegetic sound being the tense music building up to scene of climax, of which there are numerous in this film. Bourne is shown behind a tree watching Desh go past on moped, while Nicky is sat at a table in Cafà © de Paris. Desh stops and gets off the moped, while Bourne watches, unnoticed and Vosen and his team see Deshs â€Å"unscheduled stop† on a digital map. Desh picks up the phone that Nicky has left on the table for him, and Bourne then follows him, ingeniously grabbing keys for a moped f rom someones hand without their knowing; another indication of Bournes intensive training. Bourne is then shown starting the moped, ready to follow. Vosens team are shown and tell him â€Å"Subject is on the move, en route to subject. [Daniels]† Wills, part of Vosens team then tells him that there has been a breach of the CIA protocol. They discover that instructions were sent to Desh, and then discover that they were sent from Nicky Parsons computer. Vosen asks where the deviation occurred, and when he is satisfied tells a member of the team: â€Å"When were finished with Daniels, send the asset after her† (to assassinate her). Pamela Landy asks what he is doing, and he refuses to answer. She asks him on what basis he is continuing the operation on, and he responds that on the basis that Nicky has â€Å"compromised a covert operation†. Landy responds by saying that the operation is about the assassination of Daniels, not of Nicky. Vosen believes that she has be trayed them, whereas Landy believes that these could be exceptional circumstances; she could have been pressured into sending the message by Bourne. The conversation intensifies and Vosen says that she is in league with Jason Bourne; he believes that this is sufficient evidence to kill her. Landy shouts at him: â€Å"You do not have the authority to kill her!† â€Å"Oh yes I do.† Responds Vosen, â€Å"And you had better get on board.† Landy argues, saying that Nicky is a member of the CIA, and that: â€Å"You start down this path, when does it end?† Here Landy is saying that once he kills one member of the CIA, how many more will he kill? Vosen defends by saying that â€Å"It ends when weve won.† Here the intense argument ends, but Landy stares at Noah grudgingly, and there is a huge sense of tension in the air. Desh receives a message from the CIA, telling him to kill Nicky and Bourne after he kills Daniels. Desh looks in the motorbikes side-view mirror and sees Bourne, realising that he is following him. Vosen tells the bank in Tangier to release the funds. This is used as bait for Daniels to leave the hotel. He receives a phone call telling him this and leaves the building, while Desh continues on the moped. He stops and parks the moped, and Bourne does the same, albeit a distance away, as Bourne believes that Desh has not noticed him. Daniels is shown driving not far away. Desh drops a backpack near a car and as he sees Daniels come down the road, stands in the middle of the road telling him not to come further, when Bourne realises that Desh has tricked him, and the bomb is located on a moped parked directly next to Daniels car. Bourne tries to warn Daniels, but fails as Desh detonates the bomb, destroying his car and ultimately killing Daniels. Bourne, who is very close to the bombs impact, is knocked to the ground, and Desh seeing this believes that Bourne is dead and goes after Nicky. The success of the Bourne trilogy is in the fact that it reinvents the spy genre, by including increasingly more intellectual elements and being unique from other spy films because of this. Jason Bourne, the protagonist of the series has a strong appeal to the viewer throughout the series, despite the viewer knowing that he is an assassin and has killed many people ruthlessly before. Thus, throughout the series at no point does the viewer lack sympathy for Bourne, as they realise that his actions are dictated by desperation and the need for survival of him and those close to him, Marie for example. The themes in the film are of a serious tone, such as the idea of the CIA sending countless people after Bourne and those close to him, for him and those people mentioned to be assassinated. In the films however, particularly The Bourne Identity and The Bourne Supremacy, there exist a number of less serious themes, such as Bournes affection and love toward Marie in The Bourne Identity and The Bourne Supremacy, and his innocence throughout the series, particularly in the first film, when he cannot remember who he is. Overall, the series is pleasing for the viewer as it presents a unique take on the spy genre, with a more serious tone, yet still managing to mix less serious themes with these.

Essay --

1. A stakeholder is a person or group of people that has an interest or concern in an organization. There are a lot of different things that can affect a stakeholder such as the organizations actions, policies, and even sometimes their objectives. An example of a negative impact on stakeholders would be when an organization has to cut their costs and therefore has to start laying off employees. The stakeholders in this case would be Merck as there decided to try to pour a lot of money into research to develop new medications. Stakeholders are really important because they are ultimately what decide if a company survives or not. A business or organization needs to have stakeholders to be able to submit payments to them monthly to help them succeed. 2. There are a lot of potential costs and benefits of such an investment this is exhibited in this case. Profits that Merck made based on their selling of prescription drugs was not the only thing that they cared about and wasn’t in high priority to them. All that Merck tried to do was have the ability to feel like and think that the medicine that they have is for the people and that the profit comes second. Merck feels like if they remember this then they will have the ability to be able to make profits without even trying. All businesses need to be able to examine the positive and negative effects of all of their products or services. Most of the time business managers are only interested in seeing the bottom line, but in this case they care a lot more about their customers and what they have to offer them. 3. There are many different kinds of corporate social responsibility that all can help a company be successful if they are used correctly. My assessment of the company is that I ... ...potential and willing to give their all to your organization. 7. If I was running an organization or company, being the manager there would be certain ways that I would go about communication the corporate social responsibility to all of my employees. Being able to communicate this effectively with all of your employees allows you to establish a strong corporate culture and also strengthen a lot of the relationships that exist within your organization. The most important goal that all organizations want to be able to achieve is to have the ability to communicate the CSR effectively to help their employees be able to be engaged fully in the company. Some of the ways that I would use to be able to communicate the CSR to my employees and workforce effectively would be as follows: †¢ Social networking sites †¢ Videos †¢ Forums †¢ Websites †¢ Blogs †¢ Meetings †¢ Newsletters Essay -- 1. A stakeholder is a person or group of people that has an interest or concern in an organization. There are a lot of different things that can affect a stakeholder such as the organizations actions, policies, and even sometimes their objectives. An example of a negative impact on stakeholders would be when an organization has to cut their costs and therefore has to start laying off employees. The stakeholders in this case would be Merck as there decided to try to pour a lot of money into research to develop new medications. Stakeholders are really important because they are ultimately what decide if a company survives or not. A business or organization needs to have stakeholders to be able to submit payments to them monthly to help them succeed. 2. There are a lot of potential costs and benefits of such an investment this is exhibited in this case. Profits that Merck made based on their selling of prescription drugs was not the only thing that they cared about and wasn’t in high priority to them. All that Merck tried to do was have the ability to feel like and think that the medicine that they have is for the people and that the profit comes second. Merck feels like if they remember this then they will have the ability to be able to make profits without even trying. All businesses need to be able to examine the positive and negative effects of all of their products or services. Most of the time business managers are only interested in seeing the bottom line, but in this case they care a lot more about their customers and what they have to offer them. 3. There are many different kinds of corporate social responsibility that all can help a company be successful if they are used correctly. My assessment of the company is that I ... ...potential and willing to give their all to your organization. 7. If I was running an organization or company, being the manager there would be certain ways that I would go about communication the corporate social responsibility to all of my employees. Being able to communicate this effectively with all of your employees allows you to establish a strong corporate culture and also strengthen a lot of the relationships that exist within your organization. The most important goal that all organizations want to be able to achieve is to have the ability to communicate the CSR effectively to help their employees be able to be engaged fully in the company. Some of the ways that I would use to be able to communicate the CSR to my employees and workforce effectively would be as follows: †¢ Social networking sites †¢ Videos †¢ Forums †¢ Websites †¢ Blogs †¢ Meetings †¢ Newsletters

Vampire Academy Chapter 20

TWENTY MY MOUTH DROPPED OPEN. â€Å"Uh†¦wait†¦you mean sex?† My astonishment prevented me from thinking of a better response. Mason thought it was hysterical. Jesse looked like he wanted to die. â€Å"Of course I mean sex. She said she'd do it if we said that we'd†¦you know†¦Ã¢â‚¬  I made a face. â€Å"You guys didn't both, uh, do it at the same time, did you?† â€Å"No,† said Jesse in disgust. Ralf kind of looked like he wouldn't have minded. â€Å"God,† I muttered, pushing hair out of my face. â€Å"I can't believe she hates us that much.† â€Å"Hey,† exclaimed Jesse, reading into my insinuation. â€Å"What's that supposed to mean? We're not that bad. And you and me – we were pretty close to – â€Å" â€Å"No. We weren't even close to that.† Mason laughed again, and something struck me. â€Å"If this†¦if this happened back then, though†¦she must have still been dating Aaron.† All three guys nodded. â€Å"Oh. Whoa.† Mia really hated us. She'd just moved beyond poor-girl-wronged-by-girl's-brother and well into sociopath territory. She'd slept with these two and cheated on a boyfriend whom she seemed to adore. Jesse and Ralf looked incredibly relieved when we walked away. Mason slung a lazy arm around my shoulders. â€Å"Well? What do you think? I rule, right? You can tell me. I won't mind.† I laughed. â€Å"How'd you finally find that out?† â€Å"I called in a lot of favors. Used some threats. The fact that Mia can't retaliate helped too.† I recalled Mia accosting me the other day. I didn't think she was entirely helpless yet but didn't say so. â€Å"They'll start telling people on Monday.† he continued. â€Å"They promised. Everyone'll know by lunch.† â€Å"Why not now?† I asked sulkily. â€Å"They slept with a girl. Hurts her more than them.† â€Å"Yeah. True. They didn't want to deal with it tonight. You could start telling people if you wanted to. We could make a banner.† With as many times as Mia had called me a slut and a whore? Not a bad idea. â€Å"You got any markers and paper?†¦Ã¢â‚¬  My words trailed off as I stared across the gym to where Lissa stood surrounded by admirers, Aaron's arm around her waist. She wore a sleek pink cotton sheath in a shade I never could have pulled off. Her blond hair had been pulled up in a bun that she'd used little crystal hairpins on. It almost looked like she wore a crown. Princess Vasilisa. The same feelings as earlier hummed through to me, anxiety and excitement. She just couldn't quite enjoy herself tonight. Watching her from the other side of the room, lurking in the darkness, was Christian. He practically blended into the shadows. â€Å"Stop it,† Mason chided me, seeing my stare. â€Å"Don't worry about her tonight.† â€Å"Hard not to.† â€Å"It makes you look all depressed. And you're too hot in that dress to look depressed. Come on, there's Eddie.† He dragged me away, but not before I cast one last glance at Lissa over my shoulder. Our eyes met briefly. Regret flashed through the bond. But I pushed her out of my head – figuratively speaking – and managed to put on a good face when we joined a group of other novices. We earned a lot of mileage by telling them about the Mia scandal and, petty or not, seeing my name cleared and getting revenge on her felt amazingly good. And as those in our group wandered off and mingled with others, I could see the news spreading and spreading. So much for waiting until Monday. Whatever. I didn't care. I was actually having a good time. I fell into my old role, happy to see I hadn't grown too dusty in making funny and flirty remarks. Yet, as time passed and Eddie's party grew closer, I started to feel Lissa's anxiety pick up in intensity. Frowning, I stopped talking and turned around, scanning the room for her. There. She was still with a group of people, still the sun in her little solar system. But Aaron was leaning very close to her, saying something in her ear. A smile I recognized as fake was plastered across her face, and the annoyance and anxiety from her increased further. Then it spiked. Mia had walked up to them. Whatever she'd come to say, she didn't waste any time in saying it. With the eyes of Lissa's admirers on her, little Mia in her red dress gestured wildly, mouth working animatedly. I couldn't hear the words from across the room, but the feelings grew darker and darker through the bond. â€Å"I've got to go,† I told Mason. I half walked, half ran over to Lissa's side, catching only the tail end of Mia's tirade. She was yelling at Lissa full force now and leaning into her face. From what I could tell, word must have reached her about Jesse and Ralf selling her out. † – you and your slutty friend! I'm going to tell everyone what a psycho you are and how they had to lock you in the clinic because you're so crazy. They're putting you on medication. That's why you and Rose left before anyone else could find out you cut – â€Å" Whoa, not good. Just like at our first meeting in the cafeteria, I grabbed her and jerked her away. â€Å"Hey,† I said. â€Å"Slutty friend here. Remember what I said about standing too close to her?† Mia snarled, baring her fangs. As I'd noted before, I couldn't feel too sorry for her anymore. She was dangerous. She had stooped low to get back at me. Now, somehow, she knew about Lissa and the cutting. Really knew, too; she wasn't just guessing. The information she had now sounded both like what the guardians on the scene had reported, as well as what I'd told them about Lissa's history. Maybe some confidential doctor's stuff too. Mia'd snagged the records somehow. Lissa realized it too, and the look on her face – scared and fragile, no more princess – made my decision for me. It didn't matter that Kirova had spoken the other day about giving me my freedom, that I'd been having a good time, and that I could have let my worries go and partied tonight. I was going to ruin everything, right here and right now. I'm really not good with impulse control. I punched Mia as hard as I could – harder, I think, than I'd even hit Jesse. I heard a crunch as my fist impacted her nose, and blood spurted out. Someone screamed. Mia shrieked and flew backwards into some squealing girls who didn't want to get blood on their dresses. I swooped in after her, getting in one more good punch before somebody peeled me off her. I didn't fight restraint as I had when they'd taken me from Mr. Nagy's classroom. I'd expected this as soon as I'd swung at her. Stopping all signs of resistance, I let two guardians lead me out of the dance while Ms. Kirova tried to bring some semblance of order. I didn't care what they did to me. Not anymore. Punish or expel. Whatever. I could handle – Ahead of us, through the ebbing and flowing waves of students passing through the double doors, I saw a figure in pink dart out. Lissa. My own out-of-control emotions had overridden hers, but there they were, flooding back into me. Devastation. Despair. Everyone knew her secret now. She'd face more than just idle speculation. Pieces would fall together. She couldn't handle that. Knowing I wasn't going anywhere, I frantically searched for some way to help her. A dark figure caught my eye. â€Å"Christian!† I yelled. He'd been staring at Lissa's retreating figure but glanced up at the sound of his name. One of my escorts shushed me and took my arm. â€Å"Be quiet.† I ignored her. â€Å"Go after her,† I called to Christian. â€Å"Hurry.† He just sat there, and I suppressed a groan. â€Å"Go, you idiot!† My guardians snapped at me to be quiet again, but something inside of Christian woke up. Springing up from his lounging position, he tore off in the direction Lissa had traveled. No one wanted to deal with me that night. There'd be hell to pay tomorrow – I heard talk of suspension or possibly even expulsion – but Kirova had her hands full with a bleeding Mia and a hysterical student body. The guardians escorted me to my room under the watchful eye of the dorm matron who informed me she'd check on me every hour to make sure I stayed in my room. A couple guardians would also hang out around the dorm's entrances. Apparently I was now a high-security risk. I'd probably just ruined Eddie's party; he'd never sneak a group up to his room now. Heedless of my dress, I flounced onto the floor of my room, crossing my legs underneath me. I reached out to Lissa. She was calmer now. The events from the dance still hurt her terribly, but Christian was soothing her somehow, although whether it was through simple words or physical mojo, I couldn't say. I didn't care. So long as she felt better and wouldn't do anything stupid. I returned to myself. Yes, things were going to get messy now. Mia and Jesse's respective accusations were going to set the school on fire. I probably would get thrown out and have to go live with a bunch of skanky dhampir women. At least Lissa might realize Aaron was boring and that she wanted to be with Christian. But even if that was the right thing, it still meant – Christian. Christian. Christian was hurt. I snapped back into Lissa's body, suddenly sucked in by the terror pounding through her. She was surrounded, surrounded by men and women who had come out of nowhere, bursting up into the attic of the chapel where she and Christian had gone to talk. Christian leapt up, fire flaring from his fingers. One of the invaders hit him on the head with something hard, making his body slump to the ground. I desperately hoped he was okay, but I couldn't waste any more energy worrying about him. All my fear was for Lissa now. I couldn't let the same thing happen to her. I couldn't let them hurt her. I needed to save her, to get her out of there. But I didn't know how. She was too far away, and I couldn't even escape her head at the moment, let alone run over there or get help. The attackers approached her, calling her Princess and telling her not to worry, and that they were guardians. And they did seem like guardians. Definitely dhampirs. Moving in precise, efficient ways. But I didn't recognize them as any of the guardians from school. Neither did Lissa. Guardians wouldn't have attacked Christian. And guardians certainly wouldn't be binding and gagging her – Something forced me out of her head, and I frowned, staring around my room. I needed to go back to her and find out what had happened. Usually the connection just faded or I closed it off, but this – this was like something had actually removed me and pulled me. Pulled me back here. But that made no sense. What could pull me back from†¦wait. My mind blanked. I couldn't remember what I'd just been thinking about. It was gone. Like static in my brain. Where had I been? With Lissa? What about Lissa? Standing up, I wrapped my arms around myself, confused, trying to figure out what was going on. Lissa. Something with Lissa. Dimitri, a voice inside my head suddenly said. Go to Dimitri. Yes. Dimitri. My body and spirit burned for him all of a sudden, and I wanted to be with him more than I ever had before. I couldn't stay away from him. He'd know what to do. And he'd told me before I should come to him if something was wrong with Lissa. Too bad I couldn't remember what that was. Still. I knew he'd take care of everything. Getting up to the staff wing of the dorm wasn't hard, since they wanted to keep me inside tonight. I didn't know where his room was, but it didn't matter. Something was pulling me to him, urging me closer. An instinct pushed me toward one of the doors, and I beat the living daylights out of it. After a few moments, he opened it, brown eyes widening when he saw me. â€Å"Rose?† â€Å"Let me in. It's Lissa.† He immediately stepped aside for me. I'd apparently caught him in bed, because the covers were peeled back on one side and only a small tableside lamp shone in the darkness. Plus, he wore only cotton pajama bottoms; his chest – which I'd never seen before, and wow, did it look great – was bare. The ends of his dark hair curled near his chin and appeared damp, like he'd taken a shower not so long ago. â€Å"What's wrong?† The sound of his voice thrilled me, and I couldn't answer. I couldn't stop staring at him. The force that had pulled me up here pulled me to him. I wanted him to touch me so badly, so badly I could barely stand it. He was so amazing. So unbelievably gorgeous. I knew somewhere something was wrong, but it didn't seem important. Not when I was with him. With almost a foot separating us, there was no way I could easily kiss his lips without his help. So instead, I aimed for his chest, wanting to taste that warm, smooth skin. â€Å"Rose!† he exclaimed, stepping back. â€Å"What are you doing?† â€Å"What do you think?† I moved toward him again, needing to touch him and kiss him and do so many other things. â€Å"Are you drunk?† he asked, holding his hand out in a warding gesture. â€Å"Don't I wish.† I tried to dodge around him, then paused, momentarily uncertain. â€Å"I thought you wanted to – don't you think I'm pretty?† In all the time we'd known each other, in all the time this attraction had built, he'd never told me I was pretty. He'd hinted at it, but that wasn't the same. And despite all the assurances I had from other guys that I was hotness incarnate, I needed to hear it from the one guy I actually wanted. â€Å"Rose, I don't know what's going on, but you need to go back to your room.† When I moved toward him again, he reached out and gripped my wrists. With that touch, an electric current shot through both of us, and I saw him forget whatever he'd just been worrying about. Something seized him too, something that made him suddenly want me as much I wanted him. Releasing my wrists, he moved his hands up my arms, sliding slowly along my skin. Holding me in his dark, hungry gaze, he pulled me to him, pressing me right up to his body. One of his hands moved up the back of my neck, twining his fingers in my hair and tipping my face up to his. He brought his lips down, barely brushing them against mine. Swallowing, I asked again, â€Å"Do you think I'm pretty?† He regarded me with utter seriousness, like he always did. â€Å"I think you're beautiful.† â€Å"Beautiful?† â€Å"You are so beautiful, it hurts me sometimes.† His lips moved to mine, gentle at first, and then hard and hungry. His kiss consumed me. His hands on my arms slid down, down my hips, down to the edge of my dress. He gathered up the fabric in his hands and began pushing it up my legs. I melted into that touch, into his kiss and the way it burned against my mouth. His hands kept sliding up and up, until he'd pulled the dress over my head and tossed it on the floor. â€Å"You†¦you got rid of that dress fast,† I pointed out between heavy breaths. â€Å"I thought you liked it.† â€Å"I do like it,† he said. His breathing was as heavy as mine. â€Å"I love it.† And then he took me to the bed.

Is Lebanon a Fragile State?

Introduction Middle Eastern nation states came into existence not as a result of naturally-evolving and unique historical, social, or political processes reaching a nexus of cohesion, but rather, they emerged as a manifestation of the fragility of colonial power in the region (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). The history of statehood in the Middle East and its establishment by colonial powers has ensured that this remains a fragile and unstable region (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4).After the collapse of the Ottoman empire the state structure of Lebanon, for example, was instituted to ensure the protection and local hegemony of the Christian Maronites, who were backed by the French in the 1930s and 1940s (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). The consequences of this structuring can still be felt today (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). Furthermore, external actors continue to provide support – either through foreign aid or their policies – to certain select actors within fragile state systems.Such a process of â €Å"choosing sides† only causes further instability and exacerbates state fragility (Zweiri a. o. 2008: 4). In the contemporary turbulent world of globalization and ever-increasing interdependence across individuals, groups, international organizations and nation-states, the existence of weak/fragile/failed states is more and more seen as a significant concern (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 2). The media, states, and international organizations have seen such states as threats to order and stability in the international system (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 2).Failed states are seen as being associated with a range of problems: economic, social, political, and military (Iqbal & Starr 2007: 3). And they are seen as having a wide range of negative consequences for their own people, their neighbors, their regions, and the global community; â€Å"the chief reason why the world should worry about state failure is that it is contagious† (The Economist, cited in Iqbal & Starr 2007: 3). Is Lebano n a fragile state?Since her independence Lebanon has struggled in keeping up the difficult balance: a small country in a conflict zone, Christians versus Muslims, the civil war, the negative influence of big neighbor Syria, the role of the Palestinians and the refugee problem, the tension with Israel, the murder of former prime minister Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005 which put the political order of the country in great danger, the emergence of Muslim adicalism and extremism and the rise of Hezbollah, the crumbling of the Christian community and the role of the Lebanese diasporas. To answer this question the political order of Lebanon will be examined from a geo-political and internal perspective. The book Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis, is taken as starting point for this paper. It is one of the books from the ‘Middle East in Focus series’, edited by Barry Rubin. The Middle East has become simultaneously the world’s most controversial, crisis-ridden, and yet least-understood region.Taking new perspectives on the area that has undergone the most dramatic changes, the Middle East in Focus series seeks to bring the best, most accurate expertise to bear for understanding the area’s countries, issues, and problems. The resulting books are designed to be balanced, accurate, and comprehensive compendiums of both facts and analysis presented clearly for both experts and the general reader. To answer the central question, the concept of a ‘fragile state’ will first be scrutinized. In the following section the demographics of Lebanon will be reflected upon. The third section outlines the Lebanese state and political system.The fourth section takes into consideration the external influences on the country. The final section depicts the effects of these various factors on the fragility of the Lebanese political system. 1. Conceptualization and determinants of a fragile state The Failed States Index 2010 ranks Lebanon on the 34th place. With a score of 90. 9/120 the country is considered to be â€Å"in danger† (Foreign Policy 2011b). What does â€Å"state failure† actually mean? There is no agreement on what constitutes fragility and no state likes to be labeled as fragile by the international community (Iqbal & Starr: 4, see also Stewart and Brown 2010).Below a set of existing definitions or characterizations of the general phenomenon of state failure will be outlined. It is helpful to begin by looking at existing definitions within the aid community. According to the Fund for Peace â€Å"A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to nteract with other states as a full member of the inte rnational community. The 12 social, economic, political and military indicators cover a wide range of elements of the risk of state failure, such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods. (Foreign Policy 2011a). The UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) definition of fragile states focuses on service entitlements (Stewart and Brown 2005: 1-2). DfID defines fragile states as occurring â€Å"†¦ where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty re duction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves. (DfID 2005: 7). Four broad categories of â€Å"indicative features of fragile states† were provided: state authority for safety and security; effective political power; economic management; administrative capacity to deliver services (Iqball & Starr: 4). Each was categorized in terms of â€Å"capacity† to provide them, and the â€Å"willingness† to provide them (Iqball & Starr: 4). In as much, DfID explicitly notes that it does not restrict its definition of fragility to conflict or immediate post-conflict countries (Stewart and Brown 2005: 2).Non-conflict countries which are failing to ensure service entitlements constitute fragile states under DfID’s definition; similarly, countries in conflict but which are nonetheless providing an acceptabl e level of service entitlements to the majority of the population would not constitute fragile states under DfID’s definition (Stewart and Brown 2005: 2). The definition which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) employs, is similar but goes beyond a government’s failure to provide comprehensive services and includes the protection of the population’s human rights and security: ‘States are fragile when state tructures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’ (Stewart & Brown 2010: 9). Finally, for the World Bank ‘fragile states’ refers to â€Å"countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institutional capacity, poor governance, and political instability. Often these countries experience ongoing violence as the residue of past severe conflict.Ongoing ar med conflicts affect three out of four fragile states† (World Bank 2011). From this brief review, we can see that there are considerable areas of overlap in the current use of the term ‘fragile states’ within the development community, but also differences of breadth and emphasis. Here, in this paper, fragile states are to be defined as states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision, or legitimacy.Authority failures are cases where the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from violence of various kinds; service failures are cases where the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic services; legitimacy failures occur where the state lacks legitimacy (Stewart & Brown 2010: 10). 2. Demographic dilemmas One of the features that distinguish Lebanon in the region is its social composition, a spectrum of different religious minorities. (Fawaz 2009: 25). A large majority of t he 4. million Lebanese belong to one of three main sects—Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Maronite Christians—with Greek Orthodox, Druze, and over a dozen other groups comprising the rest (Farha 2009: 83). Demographic and political representations never fully overlapped in the course of Lebanon’s history (Farha 2009: 83). Recurrent phases of incongruity between demographic and political balances of power have been a major driving force in all cycles of conflict (Farha 2009: 83). â€Å"Lebanon’s modern history has been punctuated by periodic outbreaks of fratricidal violence, followed by political compromises that recalibrated the istribution of power and privilege among the major confessional communities† (Farha 2009:83). Let’s have a closer look at the demographics of Lebanon. In Lebanon we find higher Muslims birthrates (Farha 2009: 87). Fertility favors the Shi’a of Lebanon in particular and the Muslims in general (Raphaeli 2009: 110). However, a projection based on fertility rates, ignores the lower infant and child mortality rates among Christians, which have counterbalanced higher Muslim birthrates to some extent (Farha 2009: 87).Some doubt should always be cast on the accuracy of projected estimates with regard to the precise size of the resident population as the last census took place in 1932. Different actors present different numbers for different political reasons (Farha 2009). Emigration is a big issue; there are more Lebanese living abroad than Lebanese-born living inside the country. A disproportionately high rate of Christian emigration took place from the mid-nineteenth- through the twentieth century, particularly during and after eruptions of civil strife in 1860, 1914–1918, and 1975–1990 (Farha 2009: 86). Over 900,000 Lebanese emigrated between the outbreak of civil war in 1975 and 2001† (Farha 2009: 86). By 2006, the size of the Christian community was reduced to 3 0 percent of the total Lebanese population (Raphaeli 2009: 110). However it is said that these recent immigrants were not only Christians, but also Muslims (Farha 2009: 86). It is debated whether the Christian Lebanese people worldwide outnumber the Muslim Lebanese. Against the notion that descendants of Lebanese Christians comprise the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese in the diaspora, Farha (2009: 86) argues that emigration is equally sought By Muslims and Christians.Moreover, a 2006 study conducted by the Lebanese Emigration Research Center at NDU found that the percentage departure rates within each confession were almost equal (Farha 2009: 86). This is politically relevant as MP Nimtallah Abi Nasr hopes to expand the prospective pool of expatriate Christian voters with his campaign for a (re)naturalization of second and third-generation Lebanese abroad (Farha 2009: 87). Also â€Å"Hezbollah has actively encouraged first-generation Shi’a emigrants to register their c hildren as citizens for much the same reason (Farha 2009: 87)†.Lebanon’s current power sharing covenant is far out of step with demographic realities (Farha 2009: 88). â€Å"Even the most conservative statistical conjectures leave Lebanese Muslims significantly underrepresented in the parliament and the council of ministers, an incongruity that will grow in the years ahead† (Farha 2009: 88). A revision of the 1989 Ta’if agreement, which was the basis for ending the decades-long Lebanese civil war, and in which the Christians gave up their majority whereby granting Muslims a true partnership in the political process, has been discussed though.However, up till now we see that the Ta’if agreement is being preserved not amended. Amending the Ta’if will not serve the interests of the Christians considering the population-increase of non-Christians. In view of the growing disequilibrium between demographic and political representation in Lebanon, a recalibration of the Ta’if power-sharing formula along the lines of a tripartite division of power (muthalatha) among Christians, Sunnis, and Shi’a is all but inevitable in the coming years (Farha 2009: 90).While a tripartite division of power may not correspond precisely with Lebanon’s demographic balance, it is the closest possible approximation in the absence of a census and the only recalibration formula that could conceivably win the support of all three (Farha 2009: 90). â€Å"So long as no one sect compromises a demographic majority few Lebanese would feel themselves egregiously underrepresented by a tripartite division of power† (Farha 2009: 90).However, while proposals to this effect have circulated for over two decades a sweeping revision of the Constitution is highly unlikely in the short term (Farha 2009: 90). â€Å"Indeed, the main leaders of both March 14 and the opposition have explicitly rejected Sunni-Shi’a-Christian tripartism a s an alternative to Muslim-Christian parity—a position that perhaps has less to do with innate preferences than with the political exigencies of appealing to a deeply divided and anxious Christian community† (Farha 2009: 90).Ideally, Lebanon should of course be reconfigured on a non-confessional basis. A political system is needed which is not based on the (numerical) strength of religious communities. â€Å"Although, deconfessionalization may be a better cure for Lebanon’s ailments in principle, in practice those who hold positions of power under the sectarian system are not likely to promulgate its abrogation† (Farha 2009: 90) . 3. The dilemmas of the Lebanese political system and state 3. The state â€Å"In Lebanon there is controversy over the nature of the state, as well as over national identity† (El-Khazer 2004: 6). There is a problem of defining the boundaries of the state and, more important, of the nation (El-Khazen 2004: 6). Lebanon is a multi-communal state which raises the question of legitimacy, and, by extension, the effectiveness of the political system in situations of crisis (El-Khazen 2004: 6). We see loyalties transcending state boundaries.El-Khazen (2004: 8) argues that several, interpretations explaining the weakness of the Lebanese state, and later the causes of its collapse in the mid-1970s such as the growing imbalance between loads and capabilities on the political system, the divisive forces inherent in Lebanon’s political system, increasing socio-economic inequalities along sectarian, class and regional lines or government inefficiency, nepotism and corruption, are of limited explanatory value, as none of these problems where unique to Lebanon. While Lebanon shares broad characteristic with other heterogeneous societies, it has particular features of its own† (El-Khazen 2004: 32).First Lebanon has a large number of communities that are politically active, some of whom have distinctly co mmunal agenda’s; second, in Lebanon there is no numerically dominant group which constitutes 60 or 70 percent of the total population (furthermore, the differences in the size of the three major groups are relatively small, which limits political significance); third is the changing demographic balance in Lebanon; fourth, communal transformations in Lebanon have not reached a significant degree of maturity, moreover, in Lebanon communal development has been in constant flux and disputes have changed partly because of internal politics and partly because of the unstable regional situation which has deeply affected Lebanon; fifth, what sets Lebanon apart from other divided societies is the regional order with which it has had to interact, the Middle East in one of the most unstable regional orders in the post-Second World War international system (El-Khazen 2004: 32).Where Lebanon’s problems ultimately differ according to El-Khazen (2004: 10) is in the nature and scope o f externally-generated problems originating mainly from its regional order – specifically the Arab state system and post-1967 PLO. â€Å"Lebanon’s confessional political system (†¦) functioned relatively well for over three decades. It collapsed when it was subjected to pressure, particularly externally-generated pressure, which the system could not contain while preserving its open character and the plural nature of society† (El-Kahzen 2004:32). El-Khazen (2004: 6) suggests three phases which characterize the breakdown of the state in Lebanon: first the erosion and eventual loss of power; second, the political paralysis and power vacuum; third, the collapse of state institutions and the eruption of violence. 3. 2 The political systemEver since it attained independence from the French in 1943, Lebanon’s political system has been based on the National Charter (al-mithaq al-watani)—an unwritten but enforced pact that recognizes the division of t he country into religious communities (Raphaeli 2009: 110). According to the 1943 National Pact between sectarian leaders, the president would be a Maronite; the prime minister a Sunni; and the parliamentary speaker a Shi’a (Harris 2009: 16). The charter’s distribution of power among the various religious communities reflects the fact that in the 1940s, Christians represented 60 percent of the population and the various Muslim communities occupied the remaining 40 percent (Raphaeli 2009: 110).This was adjusted to an even split in 1989. Unstable multisectarian factions rather than ideological parties have dominated the legislature (Harris 2009: 17). The Lebanese political system has some positives to it. First, Lebanon is one of the very few Middle Eastern countries where the government arises from parliament (Harris 2009: 17). Second, the Lebanese system has been the political framework for a dynamic public pluralism unheard of anywhere else in the Arab world (Harris 2 009: 17). Even the intimidation from 1990 to 2005 by the Damascus-directed security apparatus did not destroy a freewheeling civil society and an assertive media (Harris 2009: 17).Third, the reemergence of â€Å"confessional democracy† in May 2005, with Syria’s enforced military withdrawal and the first free elections since 1972, produced a parliamentary balance close to the probable numerical weight of major political forces (Harris 2009: 17). Still, Lebanon’s political system has many deficiencies. Between 1975 and 2005, it effectively ceased to function, with 15 years of violent breakdown followed by 15 years of manipulative Syrian hegemony—a hegemony approved by the West until about 2000 (Harris 2009: 17). Even when operating, the system has never reconciled representation of communities with representation of individual citizens (Harris 2009: 17). Parliamentary deputies are elected under sectarian labels at the same time as they are constitutionally bound to act for the citizenry regardless of sect (Harris 2009: 17).The allocation of parliamentary seats has become out of line with the numerical weighting of the communities (Harris 2009: 17). Only an internationally supervised census, which no one wants, can resolve the issue (Harris 2009: 17). Every community has its demographic mythology, which they do not want punctured (Harris 2009: 17). The Shi’a community has increased from one-fifth of the population in 1932 to probably around one-third today. Even under the 1989 adjustment, it gets 27 seats out of 128 when it should have at least 40 (Harris 2009: 17). 4. Regionally powered dilemmas â€Å"The external connections of Lebanon’s communal blocs involve antagonists in Middle Eastern disputes† (Harris 2009: 10).The Maronite Catholics have longstanding relations with the west; Lebanon’s Shi’a provided religious scholars who assisted the conversion of Iranians to Twelver Shi’ism in the si xteenth century, Lebanese Sunni affinities is more with Saudi-Arabia (Harris 2009: 10). The extension of Lebanon’s differences reach[es] into the divide between Sunni Arab states and Shi’a Iran and into the standoff between the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia on one hand and Syria and Iran on the other. â€Å"In this sense, Lebanon really is the cockpit of the Middle East† (Harris 2009: 10). As we shall see it is in Syrian, Israeli and Iran’s interest to see a high degree of conflict. 4. 1 Syria Due to its geography and history, Lebanon always has to deal with Syria, whose regime had always considered it as an ‘illegitimate political entity’ that has to be dominated.According to Harris (2009: 1) â€Å"Lebanon is therefore the target of all the ambitions and phobias of the Syrian dictatorship, which cannot function as an Arab power without commanding the Lebanese†. Lebanon’s multicommunal history makes for problems of coh erence in modern Lebanese politics. â€Å"Communal suspicion—today principally on a Sunni-Shi’a fault line—produces paralysis that saps Lebanon’s viability and pluralist foundations. This is fine for a Syrian Ba’thist regime that denies there is anything significant about the Lebanese and their history, despises pluralism, and regards restored command of Lebanon as vital to its own viability as the â€Å"beating heart† of Arabism† (Harris 2009: 20). Syria and its Lebanese allies paralyzed the Lebanese state, declaring the government illegitimate, refusing to allow parliament to meet, and blocking the election of a Lebanese president after Emile Lahoud finally left office in November 2007. Syrian military intelligence manipulated so-called al-Qa’ida elements in a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon—the Fath al-Islam group—to destabilize Lebanon, debilitate its army, and disrupt Lebanon’s Sunni commu nity† (Harris 2009: 19). â€Å"The problem is that the Syrian ruling clique will not leave Lebanon alone. It is determined on reassertion through its allies, and its victory will be the end of any decent Lebanon. Lebanese pluralism cannot coexist with Bashar al-Asad’s regime† (Harris 2009: 22).The 2005 murder of Rafik Hariri started a period of exceptional domestic political turbulence and regional tensions, it led to institutional paralysis (ICG 2010: i). Initially experts accused Damascus. It is assumed that it is part of a Syrian plot to destabilize the country. Officially no one knows who carried out the attack and who was behind it. What can be said is that the assassination of Hariri opened doors for many political actors to get into the Lebanese and Arab political scene. 4. 2 Israel â€Å"Throughout the relatively short history of their existence as modern states, Israel’s and Lebanon’s mutual border has proven to be largely disadvantageous to both countries† (Spyer 2009: 195).For Lebanon, Israel’s establishment was the primary cause for the eventual arrival of the Palestinian national movement to within its borders in 1970 (Spyer 2009: 195). This, in turn, was a key factor in precipitating the country’s ruinous civil war, the Israel-PLO war on Lebanese soil in 1982, the partial collapse of Lebanese sovereignty after the Syrian entry in 1990, and the partial Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon until 2000 (Spyer 2009: 195). The series of events that would lead to Israel’s involvement in Lebanon began with the Palestinian national movement in Lebanon. (Spyer 2009: 198). â€Å"Beirut became the international center of focus for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the place of residence of its senior leadership† (Spyer 2009: 198).As a result, Lebanon became one of the theatres in which the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would be played out (Spyer 2009:198). Civ il order broke down in Lebanon in 1975, in a civil war in which the Palestinians played a central role. Contacts between Israel and prominent Lebanese Maronite politicians had been developing since the mid-1970s against the background of the breakdown of civil order in Lebanon and the central role of the PLO in the Muslim/ leftist coalition against which the Maronites were fighting (Spyer 2009: 199). Over time, Bashir Gemayel, most prominent among anti- Syrian Maronite leaders at the time, became the main Maronite contact for the Israelis (Spyer 2009: 199). Throughout, Bashir’s purpose was to encourage Israel to intervene against the Syrian garrison forces in Lebanon† (Spyer 2009: 199). The 1982 Lebanon War was very much the brainchild of Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister from 1977 till 1983 and Ariel Sharon the Israeli Minister of Defense during the war (Spyer 2009: 202). An anti-Gemayel, anti-Israel, anti-U. S. , and pro-Syrian alignment was now emerging as t he key political force in the country (Spyer 2009: 203). A number of inflammatory incidents deriving from Israel’s ignorance of the sensibilities of Shi’a Muslims contributed to the deterioration of the situation (Spyer 2009: 203). In 1985 Israeli forces occupied a strip of territory in southern Lebanon.A â€Å"security zone† close to the Israeli border, which was maintained in cooperation with the SLA (Spyer 2009: 204). Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the security zone took place in 2000, thus ending the 18-year period of Israeli military involvement on Lebanese soil (Spyer 2009: 205). The Second Lebanon War which began on July 12, 2006 was one between Hezbollah and Israel. Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting, changed the situation in southern Lebanon to Israel’s advantage, in that it ended the de facto Hezbollah domination of the southern border area that had pertained since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal in May 2000 (Spyer 2009: 208 ). Israel currently has no dealings with any of the major political actors within Lebanon.However, while large-scale Israeli adventures to make alliance with political forces within Lebanon are part of the past, the weakness of the Lebanese state and central authority remain very much part of the present. One of the results of this weakness, which is itself a product of the country’s divided sectarian makeup, is its vulnerability to outside penetration, and therefore its oft-repeated, luckless fate as the launching ground for attacks by various forces (the PLO, Syria, now Iran and Hizballah) against Israel, its southern neighbor. This fact remains the core reality behind Israel’s relations with Lebanon. It is unlikely that the final word in this story has been written. 4. 3 Iran Lebanon’s Shi’a community resides in the heart of the largely Sunni Arab world and on the frontline with Israel; therefore, Lebanon’s Shi’a are of double interest to their coreligionists in revolutionary Shi’a Iran† (Harris 2009: 10). â€Å"Hezbollah was and remains a militant Khomeinist Islamist movement that adheres to Khomeini’s doctrine of velayet-e-faqih, rule by a cleric in an Islamist state. Its ties to Iran are organic, multifaceted, and complex† (Badran 2009: 47). In order to understand Hezbollah’s origins properly, one must remember that the major force pushing for its establishment was the Islamic regime in Iran, as it worked to unite the Shi’a factions and forces operating in Lebanon (Zisser 2009: 158). Iran wanted everyone to work together under the Hezbollah framework (Zisser 2009: 158).The crisis situation that developed from the early 1970s onward became the breeding ground for a process of religious radicalization (Zisser 2009: 158). In these circumstances, Musa al-Sadr, a religious figure of Iranian origin, appeared and gained a position of great influence and power in the Shi’a community (Zisser 2009: 158). Hezbollah’s dilemma has to do with its identity, which contains a tension built into its very origins and being (Zisser 2009: 156). How is this tension—between the organization’s Lebanese-Shi’a identity on the one hand and its Islamic-revolutionary identity, its commitments to Iran, and its conception of the holy jihad on the other—to be resolved? The balance ow seems to be turning in favor of the Islamic-revolutionary identity, which also means turning in favor of Tehran (Zisser 2009: 156). There is no doubt that the war and its aftermath revealed as never before, and against the desire and interests of Hezbollah, the fact that the organization is the handiwork of Tehran, if not simply its instrument. Hezbollah has also been exposed as an organization dedicated to and active in achieving radical and far-reaching aims (Zisser 2009: 156-157). Its aim in the short term is to gain dominance over Lebanon and in the long te rm to turn that country into a Shi’a-dominated state ruled by Islamic law and closely linked to Iran (Zisser 2009: 157).From the mid- 1980s the organization began (with generous Iranian help) to establish a network of social and welfare services that would draw the support of the Shi’a community and provide it with an alternative to the services provided by the Lebanese state, or, to be more precise, to the benefits and aid the state should have provided for this population and did not (Zisser 2009: 159). With the build-up of this social infrastructure, the movement contributed to undermining the position of the Lebanese government. By the end of the 1980s the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah grew in popularity as a force combining opposition to Israeli occupation with a wider Shi’a Islamist ideology implacably opposed to Israel’s existence and to the West (Sper 2009: 204).Hezbollah’s advance to the international boundary in southern Lebanon made it eve n more useful to its Iranian and Syrian patrons as a deterrent force in case of threats from Israel or the United States. It seemed to have it within its power to take over Lebanon—or at least those parts of the country inhabited by Shi’a—and to establish an Islamic order there on the Iranian model (Harris 2009: 71). As a result of the Iranian-Syrian agreement after the Ta’if Accord ended the Lebanese war, Hezbollah was the only militia to be excluded from handing over its weapons under the pretext that it was a â€Å"resistance movement† fighting Israeli occupation rather than a militia (Badran 2009: 47). This was a big mistake as it induces fragility.Since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and more so after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, the fate of Hezbollah’s armed status (which has grown massively and developed doctrinally, ironically, after the Israeli withdrawal) is the central issue in Lebanon today (Badran 2009: 47). Hezbollah had pres ented itself as the â€Å"defender of Lebanon† but proved to be its ruination since it brought so much destruction down upon the heads of its people (Zisser 2009: 166). After the 2006 war Hezbollah had difficulty maintaining the ambiguity about its identity (Zisser 2009: 166). In particular, the contrasts and contradictions between the organization’s Lebanese identity and its loyalty to Iran, on the one hand, and its Islamic-revolutionary identity with its commitments to Iran, on the other, were exposed (Zisser 2009: 173).Hezbollah had tried to bridge or obscure these troublesome conflicting elements over the years (Zisser 2009: 173). Yet in the moment of truth it became clear that it was not prepared to renounce its partially hidden agenda—that is, its loyalty to Iran and the ideas of radical Islam and jihad (Zisser 2009: 173). Hezbollah was now perceived more and more as a Shi’a organization serving the interests of Iran, as well as being an organizatio n sinking deeper and deeper into the quicksand of Lebanese politics (Zisser 2009: 166). It dragged Lebanon into a bloody battle with Israel, whose price was paid, first and foremost, by the Shi’a of Lebanon but also by many other Lebanese from other ethnic communities (Zisser 2009: 173).It seems that the organization, inspired and helped by Iran, its ally and patron, is more committed than ever to continue the long and unremitting struggle it began when it was first established in the early 1980s, with the ultimate aim of taking power in Lebanon (Zisser 2009: 174). The possibility that Hezbollah might succeed in its mission has become more realistic, thanks to the demographic processes taking place in Lebanon. Hezbollah is therefore a major destabilizing factor (Zisser 2009: 175). 5. Lebanon: a conflict-affected fragile state When Lebanon gained independence in 1941, the country found itself at a loss without the French hierarchy to maintain internal control and order. A new class of political elites, with little experience, was forced to discover ways to deal with the diversity of Lebanese society. It was with this in mind that the National Pact of 1943 was crafted.The Pact was based on the census of 1932, and sought to address divisions among the Lebanese, but in the end, it would only serve to deepen them. In the years after the Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict landed on Lebanon’s doorstep with the arrival of Palestinian commandos. Many Palestinian refugees, as well as militants, settled in camps in southern Lebanon, the legacy of which continues to influence Lebanese society. The migration of Shi’a to the capital, which was triggered by Israeli raids, heightened the already volatile mix of interests within the Lebanese political sphere. Ignored throughout the mandate years, the introduction of the confessional system saw the Shi’a fight for an equal voice alongside the Sunnis, Druze, and Maronites.As Lebanese s ociety became increasingly divided, individual sectarian groups began to arm themselves militarily through their own militia organizations. Today, these militias still play a key role within the Lebanese security sphere. Ultimately, the Palestinian presence within Lebanon acted as a trigger to the outbreak of civil war among all Lebanese factions. Although Palestinian militants were the original cause of the war, it was sectarian interest and division that sustained the conflict well into the following decade. The ceasefire agreement reached by Syria and the PLO in 1976 sealed Syrian dominance within Lebanon and has had a lasting impact on the country well into the early 2000s.Nonetheless, the agreement did little to improve sectarian division and militia violence on the ground. The decades following the 1982 Israeli War continued to be marred by sectarian conflict and an international tug of war for Lebanon. Tensions along the Lebanese-Israeli border have continued well into the pr esent day, in light of suspicions that Hezbollah is rearming for any future conflict. Ultimately, the greatest consequence of the summer war can be understood in terms of power within Lebanon. Indeed, the summer 2006 war marked the advent of power for Hezbollah, both within Lebanon and throughout the region. Considering it is a non-state actor, and that Lebanese President Fouad Siniora was in power, Hezbollah acted with state authority.This conflict reopened old wounds within Lebanese society, seeing as Hezbollah feels vindicated by the 2006 conflict and now seeks full recognition of its power. Moreover, state fragility is further deepened in a context where conflict has led to the intervention of external actors, each of whom have chosen sides in a dispute whose political and strategic consequences extend well beyond Lebanon. The current dynamics of fragile state security in Lebanon are not being dictated by Lebanese interests, but rather by the broader external policy aims of fore ign parties such as Syria, Israel, and Iran. This situation is particularly problematic for the prospects of long-term and lasting stability within Lebanon.Although sectarian politics have been an influential reality since Lebanon became a fully independent state in 1941, they have taken on a new shape in an environment defined by the post 9/11 context and by three main evolutions, namely the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese President Rafik Hariri, the 2005 withdrawal of Syrian military forces, and Hezbollah’s rise to power in Lebanon. Conclusion The central question throughout this paper has been whether Lebanon is a fragile state or not. The precarious political order of Lebanon has illustrated the distinctiveness of the country. Although colonial rule is not unique to the Lebanon, its colonial past, combined with the evolution of politics, economics, and society in the region, as well as the role played by external actors, molds a very specific set of circumstances vi s-a-vis state security that translates into an expression of fragile state security very specific to the region. The Lebanese State has always been weak.Politicians have generally sought to serve interests of their constituencies instead of the national interest. This factor has its roots in the National Pact that limited the authority of the state to maximize the autonomy of sectarian groups. As a result, Lebanese citizens feel loyalty towards their community instead of towards the country. Lebanon’s political system erodes the authority of the state by fuelling clientelism. Foreign protection of or influence on each community further undermines this authority. Moreover, Lebanon’s political system makes the state vulnerable to any stifled sense of frustration or injustice or dispossession felt by any community. Consequently, patronage networks swiftly re-emerged.In all, Lebanon’s political system is based upon the principle that the State should interfere in so ciety as little as possible. The resulting weakness of state institutions has made Lebanon vulnerable to infringements of its domestic, interdependence and sovereignty. The rise of Hezbollah has made this clear. In section 1, fragile states were defined as states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive basic service provision, or legitimacy. In conclusion, in this sense, Lebanon â€Å"passed† on all three domains. Lebanon fails to protect its citizens as there is significant organized political violence; civil war’s.Also there is periodic political or communal violence causing deaths and destruction. Although the authority of the state is being undermined, it does not go as far as to say that the state authority (at present) does not extend to a significant proportion of the country. Hezbollah made sure to illustrate the inadequate delivery of services by the state. Also, in Lebanon the question of legitimacy is raised, inheren t in being a multi-communal state. â€Å"Lebanon, from all observable indicators, embodies the phenomenon of schism in the political and cultural realms (†¦) it is a society without foundation, fragile, divided, disjointed and torn† (Dr.Khalaf, cited in Raphaeli 2009: 109). Bibliography – Badran, T. (2009) ‘Lebanon’s militia wars’, in: Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 35-62. – DfID (2005) Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states . Department for International Development. – El-Khazen, F. (2000) The breakdown of the state in Lebanon, 1967-76. London : I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd – Farha, M. (2009) ‘Demographic Dilemma’s’, in: B. Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 83-99. – Foreign Policy (2011a) FAQ & Methodology, Foreign policy. Online at: http://www. foreignpolicy. om/articles/2009/06/22/200 9_failed_states_index_faq_methodology(retrieved 28 February 2011). – Foreign Policy (2011b) The Failed States Index 2010, Foreign policy. Online at: http://www. foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (retrieved 28 February 2011). – Harris, W. (2009) ‘Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride’, in: B. Rubin (ed), Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 63-82. – ICG (2010) Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, Middle East Report, N °96. – Iqbal, Z. and H. Starr (2007) State Failure: Conceptualization and Determinants. Working paper, University of South

Lynchings in America essays

Lynchings in America essays Recently, an L.A. Times article (dated 2/13/00) reviewed a new book entitled "Without Sanctuary", a collection of photographs from lynchings throughout America. During the course of the article, the author, Benjamin Schwarz, outlined some very interesting and disturbing facts related to this gruesome act of violence: Between 1882 and 1930, more than 3,000 people were lynched in the U.S., with approximately 80% of them taking place in the South. Though most people think only African Americans were victims of lynchings, during those years, about 25% were white. Data indicates that mobs in the West lynched 447 whites and 38 blacks; in the Midwest there were 181 white victims and 79 black; and in the South, people lynched 291 whites and 2,462 African Americans. Though most people believe lynchings were just the manifestation of racial hatred, the author indicates that 20% of Southern lynching victims were killed by mobs of their own race. In addition, other societies such as Ancient Rome and Greece, Germany, China, Nigeria, and East Africa lynched their own. It is for this reason that Mr. Schwarz believes lynchings cannot be explained only in terms of racism and paranoid "white psyche". To find the true reason, we must consider a different point of view. According to Mr. Schwarz, in the late 19th century, there arose in the South a large proportion of transient black men who, as their labor became expendable in an increasingly industrial and commercial economy, adopted a life of crime. In the article, Mr. Schwarz writes, "There, loosened from the traditional controls of the black family and community, many led a roaming, reckless and often violent existence." The theory goes, as these African American men moved from city to city, they became easy targets for Southern whites (and some blacks) who took it upon themselves to "punish" lawless citizens. To support his theory, Mr. Schwarz refers to data that shows "Most lynchings ...

Essay on Coal and New Nuclear Plants

Essay on Coal and New Nuclear Plants Essay on Coal and New Nuclear Plants Climate change: Vision of green Britain calls for swift carbon emissions policy Energy-efficient homes crucial, says watchdog Three new nuclear plants will be needed by 2022 The PowerBuoy wave energy converter, which is to be used as part of the Wave Hub project, which will see a giant national grid-connected socket built on the seabed off the coast of Cornwall. The project will become the world's largest wave farm. Photograph: Handout/PA A green and pleasant land, with millions of electric cars powered from wind turbines and travelling between super-cosy homes and offices: that is the vision for Britain in 2020 set out today by the government's climate watchdog. That cleaner, greener country, playing its full part in averting disastrous global warming, is both possible and affordable, says the Climate Change Committee – but only if the government acts immediately to implement radical policies on energy efficiency and low carbon technologies, as well as dealing with the threat of the recession to carbon trading schemes. The recommendations from the CCC, which sets legally binding carbon budgets and advises the government on how to reach them, could see teams of renovators working street by street to insulate homes and eco-driving techniques a standard part of the driving test. Chief executive David Kennedy said that despite the recession, the changes remained affordable at 1% of GDP, and would improve our quality of life. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (Decc) published an ambitious plan to move to a low-carbon economy in July. But the CCC report, Meeting Carbon Budgets – The Need for a Step Change, is first time the committee has published its analysis of what is needed for this to be achieved. Kennedy directed his heaviest criticism at the government's leading policy, to reduce carbon emissions from homes by 35% by 2020. The carbon emissions reductions target (Cert) came into effect last year and places an obligation on energy suppliers to help homeowners reduce household emissions until 2012. "Cert has been very good at insulating old ladies' lofts and sending energy saving lightbulbs through the post," said Kennedy. "But we need a national programme for energy efficiency." He added that companies selling energy were not always best placed to advise customers on how to reduce demand. The committee recommends insulating 10m lofts and 7.5m cavity walls by 2015, plus solid wall insulation for 2.3m homes by 2022. This would require a "whole-house approach" under which an audit of each house is carried out, says the report, and schemes that would see work carried out street by street. Paul King, chief executive of the UK Green Building Council, said: "This analysis confirms what we've known for some time. Current government policies will not deliver the programme of home refurbishment that is needed to tackle energy security and climate change. Homeowners are put off by the high upfront cost of more expensive measures and the hassle of getting reliable information and trustworthy installers. The industry is crying out for strong political leadership." Dramatic improvements in the